Il Friday 16 May 2008 00:19:38 Oliver Welter ha scritto: > Hi Giovanni, > > | If a have a service running in a vserver, and this service get > > compromised by > > | an attacker, is the attacker confined to the vserver, so that he/she > > can't > > | compromise any of the other services (running in other vservers), and > > he/she > > | can't modify files outside the filesystem of the compromised vserver? > > A user inside the vserver has access to the filesystem and the processes > inside the vserver. If your setup does not share any resources between > more than one vserver, it is not possible for a user (attacker or legal > user - doesn't matter) to access filesystem resources outside the guest, > as long as you do not give special capabilities to the guest which > enable it to access kernel devices directly. > > There might be the change that the process/resource isolation code of > vserver itself has bugs - in this case you will obvioulsy loose this > security. > > | Is a vserver context more secure than a chroot jail? > > AFAIK a jail hides the filesystem but not processes - so I would give a > yes at least regarding this issue. > > Oliver So, would you implement a server to give a few services (dns, webserver, dhcp, etc.) putting each of these services in a different vserver, just to have a system more secure? What do you think about having a ssh server in each vserver and not in the main context? Is this setup more secure? Thanks.